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The Case Against Abandoning the Search for
Substantive Accuracy
Edward J. Imwinkelried ∗

I.

INTRODUCTION
1

Professor Slobogin’s new book, Proving the Unprovable, is the
most provocative evidence text that I have read in years. In the book,
he argues in favor of a more relaxed standard for admitting psychologists’ and psychiatrists’ testimony about a person’s prior mental
2
state. He contends that a person’s earlier mental state is essentially
3
unprovable and that it is impossible to gauge the validity of such tes4
5
timony in the sense of its substantive accuracy. He concludes that
the nature of such testimony ordinarily precludes the application of
the normal expert testimony standards prescribed by Daubert v. Merrell
6
7
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.
Instead, he proposes generally accepted content validity as the
8
standard for admissibility. The proposal contemplates the creation
of a database of cases in which psychiatrists’ or psychologists’ testi9
mony about prior mental state was used. The database would include information such as the reports, testimony, and verdict in the
case to identify the factors that the legal decisionmaker considered
10
relevant. The database would be used to refine structured interview

∗

Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Professor of Law, University of California, Davis.
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PROVING THE UNPROVABLE: THE ROLE OF LAW, SCIENCE,
AND SPECULATION IN ADJUDICATING CULPABILITY AND DANGEROUSNESS (2007).
2
See id. at 18.
3
Id. at 57 (describing the mental state as “ultimately unknowable”); id. at 140
(describing testimony as “inscrutab[le],” the reliability of which “we cannot know”).
4
Id. at 41.
5
Id. at 16.
6
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
7
526 U.S. 137 (1999).
8
SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 16.
9
Id. at 63–65.
10
Id. at 65.
1
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instruments.
Psychiatrists and psychologists could use the instruments to ensure that their report addressed the factors that the law
considers material in the specific context, such as an insanity defense
12
in a criminal trial.
In Proving the Unprovable, Professor Slobogin presents a balanced
analysis. In critical passages, he adds important qualifications. For
instance, he states that “scientifically verified evidence” is “usually”
13
unavailable as a basis for expert testimony about past mental states.
He writes that “[i]n those few instances when scientifically reliable information material to [the] issue [of past mental state] is available,
14
the expert should rely on it.” In addition, at several points he notes
15
the utility of malingering detection techniques.
My fear, though, is that some may not read Proving the Unprovable
closely enough and may lose sight of those qualifications. The book
is argued so forcefully that readers may instead focus on Professor
Slobogin’s broad language suggesting that the very nature of the
topic precludes policing the substantive accuracy of the relevant expert testimony. Professor Slobogin professes that his deep concerns
16
In his view, “[s]peculative clinical testimony
are epistemological.
17
. . . is probably the best we can do for the foreseeable future.”
Our difference of opinion may simply be one of emphasis and
degree. However, I feel obliged to say that I have grave doubts about
the wisdom of a general call to abandon the search for substantive
accuracy in psychological and psychiatry testimony. The purpose of
this short Article is to explain the source of my doubts. Part II of this
Article is a descriptive survey of the state of the art of determining
malingering by subjects of psychological and psychiatric interviews.
Part III is a critical evaluation of the state of that art. Part IV asks
what light the state of the art of malingering detection sheds on the
question of whether it is necessary to abandon any attempt to ensure
the substantive accuracy of testimony by psychologists and psychiatrists about a person’s prior mental state.

11

Id. at 66.
Id. at 16, 66.
13
Id. at 57.
14
SLOGOBIN, supra note 1, at 59.
15
See, e.g., id. at 65, 140; see also Dorothy Clay Sims, The Myth of Malingering: Is It
the Truth or a Lie?, PLAINTIFF, Dec. 2007, at 1.
16
SLOGOBIN, supra note 1, at 59.
17
Id. at 40.
12
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II. A DESCRIPTION OF THE STATE OF THE ART
OF DETECTING MALINGERING BY MENTAL PATIENTS
Today there are numerous methods for detecting malingering
by subjects.
A. The Adaptation of “Lie Detector” Techniques
The forensic and law enforcement communities use a number of
techniques, including polygraphy, in order to determine whether a
person is lying. Malingering is a form of lying. Therefore, it should
come as no surprise that several of these techniques have been
adapted to determine whether a subject is malingering.
By way of example, researchers have endeavored to use hypnosis
18
to determine whether a person is malingering. Suppose, for example, that the subject claims amnesia as to events involved in a civil or
19
criminal case. However, the use of hypnosis for this purpose is con20
troversial. To begin with, it can be difficult to determine the au21
thenticity of the apparent trance: Is the person actually in a trance,
22
or is the subject faking? Further, even assuming that the subject is
in a trance, some memories purportedly recovered during hypnotic
23
induction prove to be false pseudo-memories. Unfortunately, there
is no definitive test to differentiate between pseudo-memories and
24
genuine memories of events based on historical truth.
Likewise, researchers have employed drug-assisted interviews to
25
26
27
detect malingering. Psychoactive substances such as barbiturates,
28
29
30
sodium amytal (amobarbital), amphetamines, droperidol, and
31
ketamine have all been used. These drugs can induce a state of re-

18

Robert D. Miller & Lawrence J. Stava, Hypnosis and Dissimulation, in CLINICAL
ASSESSMENT OF MALINGERING AND DECEPTION 282 (Richard Rogers ed., 2d ed. 1997)
[hereinafter MALINGERING AND DECEPTION].
19
Id. at 294–95.
20
Id. at 282.
21
Id. at 285, 299.
22
Id. at 286, 293, 299–300.
23
Id. at 289.
24
Miller & Stava, supra note 18, at 289.
25
Richard Rogers & Robert M. Wettstein, Drug-Assisted Interviews to Detect Malingering and Deception, in MALINGERING AND DECEPTION, supra note 18, at 239.
26
Id. at 240.
27
Id. at 239.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 249.
30
Id.
31
Rogers & Wettstein, supra note 25, at 249.
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32

laxation and have a disinhibitory effect on the subject’s ability to
33
manipulate the content of a self-report. However, there has been
34
relatively little research into these techniques. Worse still, the available studies indicate that some patients can deceive during such in35
terviews, and there are no clearly established criteria for identifying
36
such deceptions.
B. Unstructured Interviews
For years clinicians have conducted unstructured interviews with
patients, and over the years they have identified certain indicators of
37
38
deception. The indicators include, inter alia, the following clues :
39
40
• The patient reports preposterous or absurd symptoms.
• The patient quickly accepts the interviewer’s suggestion
41
of symptoms.
42
• The patient reports rare symptoms that occur infre43
quently in the normative clinical group —for example,
44
in less than five percent of the normative group.
45
• The patient reports rare combinations of symptoms.
46
• The patient reports contradictory symptoms.
• Even if the symptoms are not outright contradictory, they
47
are inconsistent.
32

Id. at 241.
Id. at 242.
34
Id. at 241, 245, 250.
35
Id. at 247.
36
Id.
37
Richard Rogers, Structured Interviews and Dissimulation, in MALINGERING AND
DECEPTION, supra note 18, at 301, 303–04.
38
Dewey G. Cornell & Gary L. Hawk, Clinical Presentation of Malingerers Diagnosed
by Experienced Forensic Psychologists, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 375, 376 (1989).
39
Rogers, supra note 37, at 304. “In one case, neon-green blood spurted from a
gigantic Satan who was successfully vanquished in the patient’s living room with a
handy chain saw; a 60-foot Christ waited outside his small cottage to congratulate
him on his accomplishment.” Id.
40
Shayna Gothard et al., Detection of Malingering in Competency to Stand Trial
Evaluations, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 493, 503 (1995).
41
Cornell & Hawk, supra note 38, at 378.
42
Rogers, supra note 37, at 303.
43
Roger L. Greene, Assessment of Malingering and Defensiveness by Multiscale Personality Inventories, in MALINGERING AND DECEPTION, supra note 18, at 169, 177–79.
44
Rogers, supra note 37, at 310.
45
Id. at 310–11.
46
Id. at 310 (discussing “psychomotor agitation and psychomotor retardation”);
see Douglass Mossman, Daubert, Cognitive Malingering, and Test Accuracy, 27 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 229, 230 (2003).
33
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“[T]he examinee’s demeanor changes as he enters or
48
leaves the examination area.”
49
The subject overplays by reporting grossly exaggerated
50
or overblown symptoms.
51
The subject engages in global faking and indiscrimi52
nately endorses a large number of symptoms. If, for instance, the patient endorses more than two thirds of the
possible symptoms for a mental disorder, the sheer number of symptoms gives rise to a strong suspicion that the
53
patient is malingering.
Although the patient reports the blatant, obvious symptoms for the mental state, the patient does not describe
any of the subtle symptoms that normally accompany the
54
mental state.
The subject follows a curious pattern in endorsing symptoms suggested by the interviewer. Suppose, for example, that the subject alternates true and false answers to a
55
series of twenty questions.
56
57
The subject reports the sudden, abrupt onset of a
58
mental illness that ordinarily gradually emerges.

Greene, supra note 43, at 170, 174.
Steve Rubenzer, Malingering of Psychiatric Disorders and Cognitive Impairments in
Criminal Court Settings, THE PROSECUTOR, Sept.–Oct. 2004, at 3.
49
Id.
50
Eric Y. Drogin, “When I said That I Was Lying, I Might Have Been Lying”: The Phenomenon of Psychological Malingering, 25 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 711
(2001).
51
Greene, supra note 43, at 184.
52
Rogers, supra note 37, at 308.
53
Id. at 303.
54
Id.; Greene, supra note 43, at 191; Cornell & Hawk, supra note 38, at 382
(“blunted or inappropriate affect, and formal thought disorder (e.g., loose or tangential speech patterns) . . . is consistent with Resnick’s view . . . that malingerers
mimic the content, but not the form, of psychotic thinking”); JOHN PARRY & ERIC Y.
DROGIN, MENTAL DISABILITY: LAW, EVIDENCE, AND TESTIMONY 245 (2007) (“even a
practiced malingerer ‘may omit some of the more subtle symptoms of mental illness’
. . . [such as] blunted or inappropriate affect, and formal thought disorders such as
loose or tangential speech patterns”).
55
Greene, supra note 43, at 174.
56
Richard Rogers et al., The SIRS as a Measure of Malingering: A Validation Study
with a Correctional Sample, 8 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 85, 92 (1990).
57
Rogers, supra note 37, at 308.
58
Miller & Stava, supra note 18, at 286.
48
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The subject describes unrealistically severe symptoms.
Suppose, for instance, that the subject claims that he or
60
she has suffered from virtually unbearable symptoms
61
“all my life.” The interviewer should be skeptical if the
62
subject reports the majority of his or her symptoms or,
63
in the view of some researchers, four symptoms at an intense level.

C. Multiscale Personality Inventories
Some standard psychological tests have also been used to assist
64
in the detection of malingering. For example, there are indications
that malingerers claiming a mental illness perform differently on tests
65
such as personality inventories than persons actually suffering from
66
the illness.
There are numerous standard tests that have at least occasionally
been employed in the detection of deception: the Basic Personality
67
68
Inventory (BPI); the Bender-Gestalt; the California Psychological
69
70
Inventory-Revised (CPI-R); the Inventory of Problems (IOP); and
71
the relatively new Personal Assessment Inventory (PAI). In general,
in searching for evidence of a malingering performance on the test,
the researcher looks for tests in which the subject did not achieve the
72
expected proportion of correct responses. If the subject’s perform73
74
ance is atypically bad even on simple tasks —for example, two stan59

Rogers, supra note 37, at 313.
Rogers et al., supra note 56, at 92.
61
Rubenzer, supra note 48, at 2.
62
Richard Rogers, Current Status of Clinical Methods, in MALINGERING AND
DECEPTION, supra note 18, at 373–74.
63
Rogers, supra note 37, at 313.
64
Richard Rogers et al., Explanatory Models of Malingering: A Prototypical Analysis,
18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 543, 543 (1994).
65
Gothard et al., supra note 40, at 504; James R.P. Ogloff, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony Regarding Malingering and Deception, 8 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 27, 34–35 (1990).
66
Glenn P. Smith, Assessment of Malingering with Self-Report Instruments, in
MALINGERING AND DECEPTION, supra note 18, at 351.
67
R. Michael Bagby et al., Detection of Dissimulation with the New Generation of Objective Personality Measures, 8 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 93, 94–95 (1990).
68
Loren Pankratz & Laurence M. Binder, Malingering on Intellectual and Neuropsychological Measures, in MALINGERING AND DECEPTION, supra note 18, at 223, 231.
69
Greene, supra note 43, at 170.
70
Smith, supra note 66, at 366.
71
Rubenzer, supra note 48, at 3.
72
Pankratz & Binder, supra note 68, at 231–32.
73
Id. at 231.
74
Id. at 232.
60
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dard deviations below the performance for a normative clinical group
75
of persons suffering from the illness —there is a strong possibility of
malingering.
When the subject’s performance is improbably
76
77
poor —statistically significantly lower than chance —it is a commonsense inference that the subject recognized the correct answer but
78
deliberately chose an incorrect answer.
There has been some malingering research with respect to the
79
Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI). For example, there is
80
a Validity Index for the test. If the subject endorses an extremely
rare symptom manifested by less than 0.01% of the normative clinical
81
population, there is a justifiable suspicion of malingering. Further,
82
there is a Debasement scale (“Scale Z”) on MCMI-III, and some researchers have successfully used the scale to identify students who
83
were instructed to malinger on the test.
However, by a wide margin, the inventory used most frequently
84
is the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2).
The MMPI-2 has the advantage that there is available comparative
85
data for a normative group of 3475 patients. Researchers have capitalized on this data to develop several scales and indices for detecting
malingering:
86
• The Lie Scale (L): The detection strategy underlying
this scale is to identify persons who choose “items with
extremely desirable but very rare human qualities. If a
person endorsed a large number of these items, the
probability is very high that the responses would be dis87
honest.”
88
89
• The F Scales: These include the Fake Bad Scale (FBS).
Here the underlying detection strategy is based on the
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

Id.
Id. at 227.
Id. at 228–29, 230.
Pankratz & Binder, supra note 68, at 230.
Greene, supra note 43, at 169.
Id. at 182.
Id.
Id. at 195.
Id.
Id. at 169.
Greene, supra note 43, at 169; see Rogers, supra note 62, at 383.
Greene, supra note 43, at 170.
Id.
Id. at 177.
Id.
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•

infrequency or rarity of certain symptoms.
For instance, the subject might endorse several symptoms, each
91
reported by less than 10% of the normative sample.
Traditionally, malingering researchers have placed
92
greatest reliance on the F scales on the MMPI-2.
93
The Gough Dissimulation Index (Ds): In some studies,
this index has been used successfully to identify 97% of
94
the authentic profiles and 75% of the malingerers.
95
However, there are multiple versions of the Ds, and
96
there have been few studies of some of these versions.

D. Screening Specialized Instruments
The techniques discussed above have applications other than the
detection of malingering. We turn now to more specialized techniques, developed primarily or exclusively for detecting the subject’s
attempt to feign symptoms. Today there are so many such specialized
instruments that there are both full-fledged tests and screening instruments.
There are numerous screening techniques. The latest genera97
tion of screens includes: the Tehachapi Malingering Scale (TMS), a
98
brief 20-item test; the Malingering Detection Scale (MDS), a 29-item
99
instrument; the Malingering Probability Scale (MPS), a 140-item in100
strument in true-false format; the Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology (SIMS), which consists of 75 items organized
101
into five scales; and the Sentence Completion Test (SCT), which
102
includes 136 items in 12 categories.
Although most of these in103
struments are relatively short, in some studies they have been remarkably effective. For example, in one test the MPS achieved 94%

90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103

Id.
Id.
Greene, supra note 43, at 187.
Id. at 190, 194.
Id. at 190.
Id. at 194.
Id.
Smith, supra note 66, at 360.
Id.
Id. at 361–62.
Id. at 362–64.
Id. at 364–66.
Id. at 367–68.
See Smith, supra note 66, at 352.
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104

sensitivity and 88% specificity.
In another test, the total score for
105
SIMS enabled researchers to identify 95.6% of the simulators.
106
Nevertheless, the most popular screen is the M Test.
It has
107
been subjected to more rigorous testing than any other screen.
The M Test is specifically designed to detect the malingering of
108
schizophrenia.
The test consists of 33 true-false items with three
109
scales: confusion (C), malingering (M), and schizophrenia (S).
The S scale items relate to genuine symptoms of schizophrenia. In
contrast, the M scale includes 15 items related to bogus symptoms
such as extremely severe symptoms and atypical delusions and hallu110
The essential premise of the test is that a malingerer is
cinations.
111
likely to be unable to distinguish the genuine and bogus symptoms.
The attempts to validate the M Test have yielded mixed results. In
some studies, the researchers accurately classified the vast majority of
112
113
However, in other tests the
subjects, for instance, 87.3% or 95.2.
accuracy rate of the classifications has been much lower, dipping to
114
115
40% or 30.8%.
The consensus is that these screens should be used only as the
116
Rather than serving as the sole basis for
initial level of assessment.
a finding of malingering, a screen test ought to merely trigger a more
117
thorough assessment.
Many of the screens have limited probative
118
value. In some cases, the validating tests consisted of small samples.
In other cases, they have not been cross-validated with known malin119
gerers as well as test subjects instructed to malinger.
As a result, a
screening test result indicating malingering must be confirmed by a
more thorough specialized instrument.

104

Id. at 363.
Id. at 365.
106
Id. at 352.
107
Id. at 357.
108
Id. at 352.
109
Smith, supra note 66, at 352.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 353.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Smith, supra note 66, at 353.
116
Margaret P. Norris & Mary C. May, Screening for Malingering in a Correctional Setting, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 315, 322 (1998).
117
Smith, supra note 66, at 368.
118
See id. at 359.
119
Id. at 355.
105
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E. Full-Fledged Specialized Malingering Instruments
Just as there are several malingering screens, a large number of
full-fledged malingering instruments exists. The number is both
120
large and growing. The full-fledged instruments include: the Diag121
122
nostic Interview Schedule (DIS); the Dot Counting Test; the Rey
123
the Georgia Court Competence TestFifteen-Item Test (FIT);
124
Mississippi State Hospital (GCCT-MSH); the Structured Clinical In125
126
terview (SCID); the Portland Digit Recognition Test (PDRT);
127
In scoring these
and the Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM).
tests, the analyst looks for performance significantly worse than
128
chance.
If the subject’s score falls below the chance level by two
129
standard deviations, “it is likely that the person has some knowledge of the correct responses and is deliberately answering incor130
rectly.”
Although the above instruments have received some attention in
the literature, two instruments have been especially popular. One
such instrument is the Schedule of Affective Disorders and Schizo131
While the test is “not an impenetrable shield
phrenia (SADS).
132
against fabrication,” the indications are that the subject must possess a sophisticated understanding of the mental disorder in question
133
in order to malinger on the test without detection. There are three
sources for normative SADS data: forensic patients, patients with
134
schizophrenia, and jail referrals.
The instrument uses several detection strategies, including whether the reported symptom or combination of symptoms is rare, whether the reported symptoms are
contradictory, whether the subject has indiscriminately endorsed a
120

Rubenzer, supra note 48, at 2.
Rogers, supra note 37, at 319–20.
122
Drogin, supra note 50, at 713; Rubenzer, supra note 48, at 4.
123
Mossman, supra note 46, at 230.
124
Gothard et al., supra note 40, at 493, 503.
125
Rogers, supra note 37, at 319.
126
Pankratz & Binder, supra note 68, at 228–29; Drogin, supra note 50, at 713.
127
Drogin, supra note 50, at 713 (the test “has achieved positive research validation”); Mossman, supra note 46, at 230 (this is an “often-used test[] of malingered
cognitive deficits”).
128
Pankratz & Binder, supra note 68, at 228–29.
129
Grant L. Iverson et al., Evaluation of an Objective Assessment Technique for the Detection of Malingered Memory Deficits, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 667, 668 (1991).
130
Id. at 674.
131
Rogers, supra note 37, at 307.
132
Id. at 308.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 309–10.
121
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large number of symptoms, and whether the subject has rated an implausibly large number of symptoms as severe or extreme in inten135
If the subject describes several symptoms, each of which is ensity.
countered in less than five percent of the forensic sample, there is
136
good reason to believe that the subject is malingering.
Likewise,
based on the comparative data for schizophrenic and jail referral
samples, malingering is a likely hypothesis if the subject endorses
137
more than four symptoms at severe or extreme severity.
Probably the most specialized instrument is the Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms (SIRS). SIRS was first developed in
138
139
1985.
The current version of SIRS includes 172 items.
The test
140
usually requires thirty to forty-five minutes to administer and fifteen
141
minutes to score. The items fall into three categories: detailed inquiries about specific symptoms, repeated inquiries designed to test
response consistency, and general inquiries about psychological prob142
The test is organized into eight primary scales and five suplems.
143
In developing SIRS, experienced experts identiplementary ones.
fied eight primary strategies and formulated a scale to implement
144
each strategy. The strategies are as follows:
• RS: the subject has endorsed a rare symptom;
• SC: the subject has endorsed an uncommon combination
of symptoms;
• IA: the subject has endorsed an implausible or fantastic
symptom;
• BL: the subject has endorsed a disproportionate number
of blatant symptoms;
• SU: many of the “symptoms” reported are ordinarily
viewed as everyday problems;
• SEL: the sheer number of symptoms reported is improbable;
135

Id. at 310–13.
Id. at 310–11.
137
Rogers, supra note 37, at 313.
138
Id. at 321.
139
Id.; see PARRY & DROGIN, supra note 54, at 244–45 (‘[o]ne of the most promising
tools”).
140
Norris & May, supra note 116, at 316.
141
Rubenzer, supra note 48, at 4.
142
Rogers, supra note 37, at 321.
143
Id.; Gothard et al., supra note 40, at 496 (“Eight of these scales are termed primary scales, as they have consistently been demonstrated to be the most accurate in
sorting fakers from honest respondents.”).
144
Rogers, supra note 37, at 321.
136
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SEV: the subject reports a large number of symptoms at
an extreme or unbearable level of intensity; and
• RO: the subject’s self-reporting of observable behavior is
145
at odds with third parties’ observations.
A subject may be classified as a malingerer on one of three different bases: one exceptionally high scale, three or more scales in the
146
probable feigning range, or an enhanced total score.
There has
been little research involving SIRS testing of adolescents or mentally
147
retarded individuals.
But with those notable exceptions, there has
been extensive validation research with SIRS, and those studies “have
demonstrated consistently its usefulness in classifying feigners and
148
In many of the studies, the accurate hit rate
honest responders.”
149
was in the high eighty to ninety percentiles.
III. A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE
STATE OF THE ART OF DETECTING MALINGERING
Part II described the status quo of malingering testing. In light
of that data, where does malingering testing stand?
A. The Limitations of the Current State of the Art
Although there has been substantial progress in malingering tes150
ting during the past few decades, there are still some obvious limitations to the methodology.
To begin with, malingering tests are most appropriately used in
151
152
the forensic context.
Most clinicians do not utilize such tests.
145

Id. at 322.
Id. at 325.
147
See id. at 324.
148
Id.; Drogin, supra note 50, at 713 (“Where psychopathology is concerned,
the . . . SIRS . . . has fared well in follow-up studies.”).
149
Rogers, supra note 37, at 322–23, 324; Gothard et al., supra note 40, at 500, 502
(96.7%, 97.8%); Rogers et al., supra note 56, at 89.
150
See Rogers, supra note 62, at 373. There has also been substantial progress in
the techniques for forecasting dangerousness. Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness
and Expertise Redux, 56 EMORY L.J. 275 (2006).
[P]rediction methodology has significantly improved. Two decades ago,
actuarial methods for predicting violent behavior were in their infancy
and the dominant method of evaluating dangerousness was essentially
seat-of-the-pants, “clinical” speculation. Today the development of several sophisticated, empirically validated risk assessment instruments has
made prediction much more of a science.
Id. at 277.
151
Rubenzer, supra note 48, at 5–6.
152
Rogers, supra note 37, at 302.
146
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Likewise, most treating neurophysiologists do not administer the tests
153
The widespread belief is that the administration
to their patients.
of a malingering test is incompatible with developing the sort of trust154
ing relationship needed for effective treatment.
155
Moreover, many of the tests are vulnerable to coaching. Many,
156
if not most, malingerers may use relatively unsophisticated strate157
gies, based on simplistic notions about mental states. However, not
158
all feigners are naive and unprepared. On some tests, if the malingerer prepares by learning a good deal about the mental state to be
159
faked, the malingerer has a much better chance of foiling the test.
160
For example, despite early claims to the contrary, it is clear that
simulators often succeed in faking on projective measures such as the
161
Rorschach test. Moreover, the available research indicates that it is
162
However,
easier to feign a cognitive deficit than a mental illness.
coaching and advance preparation seem to have little effect on the
163
ability of either the MMPI-2 or the SIRS to detect malingering.
More fundamentally, there are concerns about the extent and
quality of the validation of some of the tests described in Part II. In
unstructured interviews, there are no standard objective diagnostic
164
criteria that the interviewer can rely on to detect malingering.
In

153

Pankratz & Binder, supra note 68, at 233.
Rubenzer, supra note 48, at 1.
155
Rogers, supra note 62, at 379.
156
In forensic practice, many malingerers tend to be relatively young and poorly
educated. See Gothard et al., supra note 40, at 498.
157
Id. at 504.
158
Rogers, supra note 62, at 379; see Ryan C.W. Hall & Richard C.W. Hall, Detection
of Malingered PTSD: An Overview of Clinical, Psychometric, and Physiological Assessment:
Where Do We Stand?, 52 J. FORENSIC SCI. 717, 718 (2007) (the Internet increases the
accessibility of information about mental diseases and how to feign them).
159
Greene, supra note 43, at 187.
160
David J. Schretlen, Dissimulation on the Rorschach and Other Projective Measures, in
MALINGERING AND DECEPTION, supra note 18, at 208, 209 (it was asserted that “the
Rorschach measures processes and traits that are largely unconscious and essentially
beyond volitional control”).
161
Id. at 212–13, 215, 221; Rogers, supra note 62, at 374.
162
See Rogers, supra note 62, at 375 (“Unlike the fabrication of a mental disorder
(e.g. a constellation of symptoms and associated features with a convincing onset and
course), feigned cognitive deficits do not require the creation of anything. Instead,
malingerers simply can claim ‘not to know’ or appear to expend effort but provide
an incorrect response.”).
163
Id. at 383.
164
Cornell & Hawk, supra note 38, at 383; see PARRY & DROGIN, supra note 54, at
243 (“a question exists as to whether clinicians have ‘any extraordinary ability to detect malingering’”; judges should weigh clinical evidence “cautiously. . . . [E]ven cli154
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the case of many techniques, there has been little or no crossvalidating research with known malingerers or persons instructed to
165
“[S]imulation research . . . should be validated with
malinger.
166
known-groups comparison.”
Persons suffering from factitious disorders feign symptoms out of a psychological need to assume the sick
167
role. In contrast, true malingerers feign symptoms due to some ex168
ternal incentive.
Thus, a research subject in a malingering study
should not only be instructed to feign, he or she should also be provided an external incentive. For example, the subject is sometimes
169
promised a financial reward to successfully fool the interviewer. In
the real world, though, a malingerer such as a criminal might be
170
much more strongly motivated to dupe the interviewer. That is why
the validation of the detection technique with a sample of known malingerers is so critical.
Finally, there is agreement that an interviewer should not rest a
finding of malingering on the basis of the outcome of a single tech171
nique or instrument.
Standing alone, no individual test outcome
or result is probative enough to constitute sole proof of malinger172
ing.
No matter how extreme the subject’s test on one test or instrument, the interviewer must confirm that test with an independent
173
technique.

nicians working in forensic settings, who are familiar with malingering, have a high
‘misidentification rate.’”).
165
Rogers, supra note 62, at 373 (remarking on “a paucity of research crossvalidating”); see also Hall & Hall, supra note 158, at 722 (known simulators).
166
Smith, supra note 66, at 370; see Rogers, supra note 62, at 374.
167
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (DSM-IV-TR) 513 (4th ed. 2000).
168
Id. at 513, 516, 739.
169
Gothard et al., supra note 40, at 495; Rogers et al., supra note 56, at 87 (offering
“an additional $5.00 for a convincing portrayal of mental illness”); Aldert Vrij et al.,
Will the Truth Come Out? The Effect of Deception, Age, Status, Coaching, and Social Skills on
CBCA Scores, 26 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 261, 276 (2002) (offering a prize they can win).
170
Vrij et al., supra note 169, at 263.
171
Ogloff, supra note 65, at 35 (“there is really no method, when considered
alone, that is entirely effective at identifying malingerers”); Rogers & Wettstein, supra
note 25, at 248 (“alone”).
172
Rogers & Wettstein, supra note 25, at 248; Smith, supra note 66, at 368; Hall &
Hall, supra 158, at 723 (noting that “there is no one way to identify the malingering
of PTSD”).
173
Gothard et al., supra note 40, at 503.
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B. The Utility of the Current Techniques for Detecting Malingering
Despite the limitations mentioned above, tremendous progress
174
has been made.
Although the contemporary tests are still imperfect, they can be
175
“very accurate.” There is impressive evidence that the use of the existing malingering detection techniques can enable interviewers to
accurately classify malingerers from persons actually experiencing the
176
In a study involving unstructured interclaimed mental condition.
views by experienced clinicians, researchers “correctly classified 37 of
39 malingerers and 20 of 25 psychotics,” achieving an “overall classifi177
In another test, relying on standard
cation accuracy of 89.1%.”
neuropsychological tests and batteries, the researchers attained an
178
overall correct classification rate of 83%. In still another SIMS test,
reliance on the total score permitted the researchers to accurately
179
In a research project employing
identify 95.6% of the simulators.
specialized screening instruments for malingering, more than 90% of
180
the feigning participants were correctly identified. In a study investigating a malingering index for the MMPI test, “researchers accu-

174

Schretlen, supra note 160, at 210–11 (“The overall increase in psychometric
research on response distortion and malingering is shown by the fact that more controlled studies have been reported during the past 15 years than during the preceding 40 years.”).
175
Mossman, supra note 46, at 246.
176
As Ryan C.W. Hall & Richard C.W. Hall noted in their article:
The validity of the MMPI has been confirmed by multiple studies. One
of the first studies, carried out in 1985 by Fairbanks et al. . . . found that
using the F scale with cutoffs of 88 allowed investigators to identify malingering of PTSD more than 90% of the time. Similar results were reported by McCaffrey and Bellamy-Campbell. Using the F scale and the
PTSD subscale, they were able to correctly identify 91% of a population
consisting of Vietnam veterans with PTSD, Vietnam veterans who were intentional[ly] malingering, and mental health professionals who were also
Vietnam veterans who were intentionally malingering.
Hall & Hall, supra note 158, at 719 (internal citations omitted); see Cornell & Hawk,
supra note 38, at 380.
177
Cornell & Hawk, supra note 38, at 380. But see PARRY & DROGIN, supra note 54,
at 243.
178
Pankratz & Binder, supra note 68, at 227; see PARRY & DROGIN, supra note 54, at
244–45 (noting that “a number of psychological validity scales, used for detecting
malingering while embedded in broader measures of personality functioning, have
met with some qualified success”; the authors mention the MMPI/MMPI-2 scales in
particular).
179
Smith, supra note 66, at 365.
180
Id. at 369.
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rately classified 97% of the authentic profiles and 75% of the malin181
gerers.”
In a large number of studies, SIRS has demonstrated its validity
182
as a method of detecting malingering.
This specialized instrument
183
Importantly, some of the empirihas been “extensively validated.”
cal investigations of SIRS have entailed cross-validation, that is, testing
the technique’s ability to detect both persons instructed to malinger
184
In a 1990 validation study involving an
and known malingerers.
185
early version of SIRS, the overall accurate classification rate was
186
In a 1995 study, researchers accurately identified 96.7% of
88%.
187
After the removal of one outlier, the total SIRS
the simulators.
score enabled researchers to correctly discriminate in 99.4% of the
188
sample. A 1997 test indicated that when researchers used SIRS in
conjunction with MMPI-2, they accurately classified 95.5% of the sub189
jects.
It remains true that an interviewer should not rest a finding of
190
191
malingering on the outcome of any one test, even SIRS.
A thor192
193
ough, multi-method assessment, including psychological inventories and specialized malingering instruments, is the soundest ap194
proach. The techniques can and ought to be used in combination.
The interviewer should use SIRS to confirm suspicions of malinger195
Despite the undeniable fallibility of
ing raised by the other tests.

181

Greene, supra note 43, at 190.
Rogers, supra note 37, at 324.
183
Id.
184
Id. at 327.
185
Rogers et al., supra note 56, at 86. This version involved 150 inquiries. Id.
186
Id. at 89.
187
Gothard et al., supra note 40, at 500.
188
Id.
189
Rogers, supra note 37, at 323.
190
Pankratz & Binder, supra note 68, at 228; Smith, supra note 66, at 368;Ogloff,
supra note 65, at 35.
191
Rogers, supra note 37, at 325.
192
Rogers, supra note 62, at 396.
193
Rogers, supra note 37, at 325. Hall & Hall explain that:
It is important to remember that there is no source of data that cannot
be manipulated or faked by a determined individual. As there is no one
way to identify the malingering of PTSD, it is critical to examine multiple sources of data and to use sound clinical judgment when determining if a patient’s symptoms are those of true PTSD or are malingered.
Hall & Hall, supra note 158, at 723.
194
Smith, supra note 66, at 363.
195
Gothard et al., supra note 40, at 503.
182
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196

individual detection techniques, the objective probability of malin197
gering is high when multiple methods point to that conclusion.
IV. THE USE OF CURRENTLY AVAILABLE MALINGERING
DETECTION TECHNIQUES TO IMPROVE THE SUBSTANTIVE ACCURACY OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY ABOUT PRIOR MENTAL STATE
As Part I noted, the essential question is whether the courts
should abandon any insistence on a showing of substantive accuracy
in determining the expert testimony about a subject’s prior mental
state. Again, the thesis of this Article is that in a significant number
of cases it is unnecessary for the courts to do so. This Part initially describes the two alternative reasoning processes that an expert can rely
on in drawing a conclusion as to a subject’s past mental state. Then
the Article demonstrates the contribution that malingering testing
can make to the substantive accuracy of both reasoning processes.
A. The Two Reasoning Processes an Expert May Logically Rely on in
Drawing a Conclusion as to a Subject’s Prior Mental State
As a matter of logic, there are two different routes that an expert
can take in order to reach a final conclusion as to a subject’s prior
mental state.
In one route, the starting point is the subject’s present mental
state. Suppose that, at trial, the focus is on the subject’s mental state
at the time of a prior event—for example, a confrontation one year
earlier. The mental condition in question is relatively permanent in
nature and could easily last one year; and during that year, there are
no events such as traumatic occurrences or the administration of
therapy likely to change the subject’s mental state. Given these circumstances, if the expert finds that the subject presently has a certain
mental state, it is a logical inference that the subject had the same
mental state a year earlier.
In the second route, the starting point is the subject’s symptomatology at the time of the prior event. Assume that that set of symptoms normally accompanies a certain mental state. That mental state
is ordinarily the cause of that constellation of symptoms, or those
symptoms are common manifestations of the mental state. If the evidence at trial establishes that the subject displayed those symptoms at
the time of the event a year earlier, again it is a logical inference that
the subject had that mental state a year earlier.
196
197

Rogers, supra note 62, at 392.
Gothard et al., supra note 40, at 503.
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B. The Contribution that Malingering Testing Can Make to Ensure
the Substantive Accuracy of the Reasoning Processes
Whichever reasoning process the expert contemplates relying
on, the malingering test can play an important role in ensuring the
substantive accuracy of the expert’s ultimate inference as to the subject’s prior state of mind.
Consider the first route, starting with a finding as to the subject’s
present state of mind. Part II described various malingering detection techniques that an expert may employ to detect whether the subject is presently feigning a state of mind. As previously stated, it
would be unsound for the expert to rely on a single test outcome in
198
determining whether the subject is malingering.
However, assume
that an unstructured interview discloses few, if any, indicators of malingering and that the subject has no abnormal scores on any of the
malingering scales for MMPI-2 or SIRS. The expert would be rationally justified in concluding that the subject is indeed experiencing
the claimed mental state.
Moreover, there is data as to the average or probable duration of
199
many mental illnesses and states.
By way of example, that data
198

See supra notes 190–97 and accompanying text.
It is true that some mental conditions are episodic and highly variable over
time. However, others tend to be more chronic in nature. PARRY & DROGIN, supra
note 54, at 227 (“those mental disorders that would justify a finding of NGRI or diminished criminal responsibility are both severe and chronic (e.g. schizophrenia,
mood disorders, DID, brain injury, and mental retardation) and, thus, may not
change substantially over time”).
In the case of major depressive disorder (also known as unipolar disorder), the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual estimates that untreated episodes typically last four
months or longer. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 167, at 354. Another authority
puts the average duration for an untreated patient at six to nine months. DAVID H.
BARLOW & MARK DURAND, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH 186–87
(1999). Further, the typical patient will experience multiple recurrences. At least
sixty percent of those diagnosed with a single episode can expect to have a second
episode. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 167, at 372. Individuals who have had
two episodes have a seventy percent chance of a third, and individuals who have experienced three episodes have a ninety percent chance of having a fourth. Id.
Similarly, in the case of bipolar disorder, many persons experience multiple
mood episodes. Indeed, five to fifteen percent of the sufferers will have four or more
episodes in a single year. Id. at 386.
In the case of schizophrenia, some signs of the disorder persist for at least six
months. Id. at 298. This is another condition which tends to be chronic in character. BARLOW & DURAND, supra, at 414.
Likewise, dysthimic disorder has a chronic course. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra
note 167, at 379. This disorder cannot be diagnosed until the individual has had
persistent symptoms for at least two years. EUGENE H. RUBIN & CHARLES F. ZORUMSKI,
ADULT PSYCHIATRY 92 (2006). It can last twenty to thirty years or more. BARLOW &
DURAND, supra, at 187.
199
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might show that a certain mental condition is relatively permanent in
nature and is likely to last indefinitely. If the mental condition is of
permanent character and there is no evidence of an intervening
200
event likely to disrupt the mental condition, there is a permissible
inference that the subject was in the same mental state earlier. That
inference is far more than a guess; considered together, the outcomes of the malingering tests and the research as to the normal duration of the mental illness provide fair assurance that the inference
is substantively accurate.
On a previous occasion, Professor Slobogin wrote that “conclusions about present mental state can help the evaluator gauge the validity of the defendant’s description of his or her past mental state,
especially if the period between the offense and the evaluation is
201
Especially in criminal cases, the period may be quite short.
short.”
Suppose, for example, that the subject is an accused criminal, arrested on the very day of the commission of the actus reus. It is plausible that a psychiatric evaluation of the accused could be conducted
within a few weeks of the incident. When the time lapse is that short,
and multiple malingering techniques point to the conclusion that the
accused is presently feigning, that is a solid inference that the accused did not have the claimed mental state at the time of the actus
reus.
Now consider the second potential route, starting with the subject’s symptomatology at the time of the prior event. Here the underlying hypothesis is that there is a connection between those symptoms
and that mental state. The research invested in the preparation of
the diagnostic criteria set out in the latest version of the American
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Dis202
orders investigated that sort of connection. The research included
203
More specifiliterature reviews, data reanalyses, and field trials.
cally, there were 150 reviews, the reanalysis of 50 separate data sets,

Cyclothymic disorder is similarly chronic. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 167,
at 379.
200
Compare the concept of continuity of state of mind used in the application of
the state-of-mind hearsay exception. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 274, at 219–20
(Kenneth S. Broun et al. eds., 6th ed. 2006).
201
Christopher Slobogin et al., The Feasibility of a Brief Evaluation of Mental State at
the Time of the Offense, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 305, 309 (1984).
202
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 167.
203
Id. at xxvi–xxvii.
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and field trials at 88 universities and research institutions involving
204
more than 7000 subjects.
In future tests conducted to refine diagnostic criteria to be used
in forensic cases, more extensive use can be made of malingering detection testing. In particular, the use of malingering detection techniques can improve the specificity of such criteria: To what extent
will these diagnostic criteria yield false positives, that is, the conclusion that a malingerer is suffering from the mental disorder? By including malingering detection testing in the experimental design, researchers can provide a much more reliable answer to that key
question.
V. CONCLUSION
Professor Slobogin’s proposed standard of generally accepted
content validity will certainly help guarantee that a mental health expert’s opinion represents something more than that witness’s ipse
dixit. I do not want to overstate either the value of malingering detection techniques or my disagreement with Professor Slobogin.
To begin with, we do not yet have established tests for detecting
the malingering of every mental state that could be relevant in a legal
proceeding. However, there are tests for a number of such mental
states. For example, there are techniques for some Axis II disor205
206
ders as well as more serious Axis I disorders.
Thus, there are
207
techniques for detecting malingering of psychoses such as schizo208
209
phrenia and affective disorders.
There are also techniques for
210
211
212
cognitive impairments including mental retardation, amnesia,
213
It would probably be fair to say that malinand memory deficits.
gering detection tests currently exist for a significant minority of the
mental states encountered by psychiatrists and psychologists.
204

William D. Wentzel, Review: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
Fourth Edition (DSM-IV), THE ADVOCATE, Aug. 1994, at 25–26.
205
Rogers, supra note 37, at 319.
206
Id. at 320.
207
Schretlen, supra note 160, at 213; Cornell & Hawk, supra note 38, at 377;
Drogin, supra note 50, at 3.
208
Schretlen, supra note 160, at 212, 215; Smith, supra note 66, at 353, 362.
209
Smith, supra note 66, at 364; Drogin, supra note 50, at 4.
210
PARRY & DROGIN, supra note 54, at 123; Pankratz & Binder, supra note 68, at
223, 231; Rogers, supra note 62, at 375; Smith, supra note 66, at 352, 364; Drogin, supra note 50, at 713; Mossman, supra note 46; Rubenzer, supra note 48.
211
Smith, supra note 66, at 358.
212
Smith, supra note 66, at 364; Rubenzer, supra note 48, at 40.
213
Pankratz & Binder, supra note 68, at 230; Rogers, supra note 62, at 376; see generally Iverson et al., supra note 129.
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Nor do I want to overstate my difference of opinion with Professor Slobogin. As Part I noted, in Proving the Unprovable, he makes it
clear that he is not making a categorical claim that it is never possible
to test the substantive accuracy of expert testimony about past mental
214
state.
He acknowledges that in a “few instances,” there may be sci215
He specifientifically reliable information about past mental state.
cally mentions the possibility of using malingering detection tech216
niques.
My primary concern is that others may cite Proving the Unprovable
as a basis for a general call to abandon any effort to ensure that the
expert’s opinion possesses a measure of substantive accuracy. In a
significant number of cases, the state of the art of malingering detection makes it unnecessary to abandon that effort. Although Professor
217
Slobogin’s proposal is a step in the right direction, we can do better; we can improve the accuracy of mental health experts’ testimony
by insisting on an appropriate use of malingering detection techniques. The existing techniques are fallible; but the use of several
techniques, including the specialized instruments, provides some reliable evidence that the expert’s opinion is correct.
Moreover, I fear that such a general call would be counterpro218
ductive.
If mental health experts publicly and formally eschew any
214

SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 57.
Id. at 59.
216
Id. at 65, 140.
217
Andrew E. Taslitz, Book Review: Proving the Unprovable, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2007, at
70, 76 (noting that “the law is likely to move in the direction [Professor Slobogin]
suggests over time”).
218
My hope is that in the short term, Professor Slobogin’s proposal would be directed primarily to the mental health community itself. One of the things that I respect the most about Professor Slobogin’s book is its candor. For example, he points
out that the proposal is not entirely novel. A similar proposal was made roughly a
decade ago by Fishman. SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 63. In the decade since, the
mental health community has evidently done little to implement the proposal. Professor Slobogin explains that there will be major hurdles to overcome in order to
implement the proposal. Id. at 67. To construct the required database, contributing
clinicians will have to adopt the same terminology and criteria. Without that, it will
be impossible to determine whether two cases are “similar enough to make accurate
comparisons.” Id. at 67–68. Further, the database will be useful only if it enables users to determine that legal decisionmakers found a particular datum or approach
persuasive. Unfortunately, legal dispositions are often opaque. Id. at 68–69. How
are we to determine what factors were critical when the disposition is by plea rather
than trial? For that matter, at trial how are we to probe behind a general verdict? I
think it is fair to say that Professor Slobogin is hopeful that the mental health community can overcome these hurdles, but he acknowledges that they may prove to be
insuperable. Id. at 70.
The upshot is that this proposal cannot be adopted immediately and perhaps
may never be able to be implemented. If the proposal is immediately submitted to
215
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attempt at substantive accuracy, the political reaction could be both
immediate and harsh. The opponents of legal doctrines such as insanity might well argue that mental health experts have finally conceded what the opponents have long claimed, namely, that there is
no assurance of the substantive accuracy of the experts’ opinions and
that in reality, the opinions represent ideology masquerading as expertise. Rather than leading to the reform of the relevant legal doctrines, the abandonment could well trigger the imposition of Draconian restrictions on the doctrines. As Mark Twain once remarked,
219
“[t]ruth is the most valuable thing we have.” We should think long
and hard before abandoning the pursuit of substantive accuracy.

legal decisionmakers—courts and legislatures—as an alternative to the status quo,
the most favorable possible reaction would be that the proposal is premature. Given
the current political climate on law and order issues, other—decidedly less favorable—reactions are distinct possibilities.
219
MARK TWAIN, PUDD’NHEAD WILSON’S CALENDAR, quoted in THE POCKET BOOK OF
QUOTATIONS 409 (1959).

